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VESTED AND CONTINGENT REMAINDERS,
A SUGGESTION WITH RESPECT TO
LEGAL METHOD
By LAURENCE M. JONES*
For centuries lawyers and judges have been engaged
in an attempt to classify remainders as either vested or
contingent, but so far the attempt has not been very suc-
cessful. The difficulties have been well stated by Judge
Weaver of Iowa, who combined a keen intellect with a
rare sense of humor:
"There is an irrepressible something in the human
mind which responds to the challenge of an unsolved
problem or intricate puzzle. With young people it
may find expression in labored efforts to answer rid-
dles or conundrums or trick questions in mathematics
or in heroic efforts to determine 'How old is Ann?'
In later years, when the young person has, like Paul,
ceased to 'think as a child' and becomes a lawyer, the
same determination to know the unknowable and
scale the inaccessible is apt to come to the surface
in a life and death struggle with the subject of re-
mainders. Thousands of that learned profession have
essayed the task of drawing a clear, definite, and al-
ways recognizable distinction between remainders
vested and remainders contingent, but unfortunately,
instead of producing what the nonprofessional person
would naturally expect, a well-beaten path which the
wayfaring court, though less than wise, may follow
and be safe, a map of the routes so laid out reveals a
labyrinth compared with which a plat of the inter-
lacing lines connecting all the stars in the firmament
would be a model of simplicity. It may also be ad-
mitted that where the courts themselves have sought
to blaze their way through a jungle of precedents and
mark each turn and twist in the route by guide-posts
* A.B., 1930, J.D., 1932, State University of Iowa; LL.M., 1933, S.J.D.,
1934, Harvard University; Visiting Professor of Law, University of Mary-
land School of Law.
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adorned with Latin quotations which everybody feels
in duty bound to admire and nobody tries to read, they
have, as a rule, found much difficulty in leaving a
clear highway which others can follow with any assur-
ance of finding their way home again."'
The trouble is caused by the fact that the traditional legal
technique involves what has been termed a jurisprudence
of conceptions,2 an idea that all problems involving re-
mainders can be solved by first abstractly classifying the
interests as either vested or contingent. The fallacy under-
lying such an approach is the assumption that it is pos-
sible to make a clear and definite classification of remain-
ders which is valid for all purposes and which is useful in
all cases; the truth is no such classification can be made.3
As a consequence, the courts which attempt to use such
a technique as the first step in the solution of all contro-
versies involving remainders eventually find themselves
in trouble. The tests which they state and apply in one
case will not work in another; remainders which are called
vested for one purpose are held contingent for other pur-
poses; the law becomes confused until neither the lawyers
nor the courts themselves can predict with any degree of
accuracy what will be the result in the next case. To
quote again from Judge Weaver:
"It is to be said, however, that there is little con-
fusion or difference of opinion upon abstract proposi-
tions or rules of law defining and governing remain-
ders. The settled definitions may be found in every
law dictionary and treatise on the law of real prop-
erty, and all admit the soundness of the oft-repeated
rule that in the construction of wills the intention of
the testator is the polestar for judicial guidance, but
confusion arises and becomes worse confounded in the
apparently hopeless inconsistency of the courts in ap-
plying these rules to concrete facts. It is a matter of
almost daily occurrence to find that remainders de-
1 Dowd v. Scally, 174 N. W. 938, 939 (Iowa, 1919).
2 See Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence (1908) 8 Col. L. Rev. 605.
3 See 1 SiMEs, FuTuRE INTEREsTS (1936) Sec. 40; RESTATEmENT, PROPERTY
(1936) Sec. 157, Note on Terminology. In the attempt to make such a
classification the courts have, at different times, applied various tests in
order to determine whether a remainder was vested or contingent. For a
statement of the usual tests and a criticism of the results achieved, see
1 Sims, supra, Sees. 68-71.
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vised in what seems to be identical form and terms
are held by one court to be vested and by another
court contingent, and not infrequently the same court
is found to be committed to both propositions. Nat-
urally, efforts are often made to avoid the appearance
of inconsistency by emphasizing minute differences in
cases, but each finespun distinction only aggravates
the lack of harmony, and leaves the lawyer or court
who is anxious to keep in line with the authorities in
ever-increasing doubt-not so much in respect to the
fundamental principles of the law of remainders as
to their practical application to the case in hand."'4
A brief survey of some of the more important problems
involving remainders will illustrate the inadequacy of the
traditional approach.
DESTRucTIBiLTY.
Historically probably the most important difference
between remainders is the fact that some remainders are
destructible; this characteristic of certain remainders is
a result of the common law doctrines regarding seisin. Ac-
cording to the rules the seisin may not be in abeyance;
some person must always be seised of the premises. 5 In
the case of remainders this means that the remainderman
must be ready and able to receive the seisin upon the
termination of the prior estate in order that there be no
gap in the seisin. This requirement causes no difficulty
where there is no condition precedent to the remainderman
taking the seisin other than the termination of the par-
ticular estate; such a remainder is called a vested remain-
der.6 Thus a remainder limited "to B", following a life
"Dowd v. Scally, 174 N. W. 938, 939 (Iowa, 1919).
' The reason for this rule is to be found in the fact that, in feudal times,
the only person from whom the lord could demand the performance of the
feudal services, or against whom a writ could be brought in a real action,
was the tenant of the immediate freehold-that is, the person who was
seised of the premises. Therefore, in order to insure that there would
always be some person who would be responsible for the performance of
the feudal obligations and against whom an action could be brought, the
rule was that there could be no gap in the seisin. See Wyman v. Brown,
50 Me. 139, 150 (1863) ; CHIALLIs, REAL PROPERTY (3d Ed., 1911) 100-101.
62 B1. Comm. *168-169; GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITS (4th
Ed., 1942) Sec. 101; KALEs, ESTATES AND FUTURE INTERESTS (2nd Ed., 1920)
Sec. 25; MILLER, CONSTRUCTION OF WILLS (1927) Sec. 213; 1 SIMES, FUTURE
INTERESTS (1936) Secs. 67-68; 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3d Ed., 1939)
Sec. 319; WILLIAMS, RrAL PROPERTY (24th Ed., 1926) 412; RESTATEMENT,
PROPERTY (1936) Sec. 157(a,b,c).
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estate, is indestructible because B is ready and able to
take the seisin whenever and however the life estate ter-
minates; that is, there is no condition other than the ter-
mination of the life estate which is necessary in order
to cause the seisin to pass from the life tenant to B. But
where there is some condition other than the termination
of the particular estate which has to be fulfilled before
the seisin can pass to the remainderman, the result is that
if this contingency does not happen before or at the same
time the prior estate terminates the remainder fails; such
a remainder is termed a contingent remainder.7 There-
fore, the rule is that a contingent remainder is destroyed
in any case in which the named contingency does not hap-
pen at or before the time the prior estate terminates, either
by the natural course of events, according to the terms
of its own limitation, or by any act which prematurely
terminates the preceding estate before the contingency
happens; in both cases the remainder fails.8 For example,
suppose, that following a life estate, a remainder is lim-
ited "to the children of A", A being a living person. So
long as A has no children the remainder is clearly con-
tingent and subject to destruction if the life tenant dies
or if he does an act which causes his estate to terminate
prematurely prior to his death. This is obviously true in
" 2 BI. Comm. *168-169; FEARNE, CONTINGENT REMAINDERS (4th Am. Ed.,
1845) *3-4; GRAY, Zoc. cit. supra, n. 6; KALus, op. cit. 8upra, n. 6, Sec. 27;
MruLF, op. cit. supra, n. 6, Sec. 222; 1 SImEs, lOc. cit. 8upra, n. 6; 2 TIF-
FANY, Op. Cit. supra, n. 6, Sec. 320; WILLIAMs, op. cit. supra, n. 6, 428.
1 By termination in the natural course of events: Ryan v. Monaghan, 99
Tenn. 338, 42 S. W. 144 (1897) ; by premature termination: , Archer's Case,
1 Co. Rep. 66b (1597) ; Blocker v. Blocker, 103 Fla. 285, 137 So. 249 (1931).
At common law a tortious conveyance by the holder of the particular
estate resulted in the forfeiture of that interest; such conveyances con-
sisted of fines and recoveries, releases with warranty, and feoffments by
which the grantor purported to convey a greater interest than he had.
1 HAYES, CONVEYANCING (5th Ed., 1840) 27-28. But such methods of con-
veyancing are now obsolete, and the only possibility of a forfeiture which
might still be of practical importance is in case the life tenant commits
waste; however, there is considerable doubt whether even that method is
still available. See 1 SIMES, op. cit. supra, n. 6, See. 100; Myerberg, Mary-
Zand Examines the Proposed Uniform Property Act (1939) 4 Md. L. Rev.
1, 47-48. Another method by which the particular estate might terminate
prematurely is as a result of the doctrine of merger. 2 B1. Comm. *177;
1 SimEs, op. cit. supra, n. 6, Sec. 102. Renunciation by the life tenant is
also a possibility, but in such a case the court may construe what in form
Is a contingent remainder to be an executory interest and thus avoid the
destructibility doctrine. 3 SimEs, op. cit. supra, n. 6, Sec. 755.
[VOL. VIII
REMAINDERS
either case because in both instances there is no person
in existence who can take the seisin. However, as soon
as a child is born to A we have a person in existence who
fits the description of the remainderman and who can take
the seisin upon the termination of the life estate; conse-
quently, the remainder is said to vest and is no longer
destructible. The fact that such a remainder is not in-
defeasibly vested but is subject to open up and include
children subsequently born to A (that is, it is subject to
being partially divested) makes no difference, since as
soon as the first child is born there is a person ready and
able to receive the seisin when and if the particular estate
terminates. 9 And for similar reasons a remainder which
is subject to being completely divested upon the happening
of some contingency is, until the contingency happens,
treated as vested and is not subject to destruction by the
termination of the particular estate.10 For instance, if
a remainder is given "to B", with the further condition
that "if B dies before A then to C", there is created in B
a vested remainder which is subject to being completely
divested. Since the condition attached to the gift to B
in no way interferes with the passage of the seisin to B
upon the termination of the particular estate, the remain-
der is considered vested and is indestructible, although it
may terminate as a result of the condition attached to
B's estate. The distinction between the above case and
a remainder limited "to B if he survives A" is a fine one
and depends entirely on the form of the limitation. In
the latter case the condition of survivorship is a condition
precedent to B's taking the seisin, and thus B's interest is
described as a contingent remainder and is subject to
destruction by any act which causes the particular estate
to terminate prior to the life tenant's death.
It thus appears that in so far as the common law rule
of destructibility is concerned, the distinction between
9 Deem v. Miller, 303 Ill. 240, 135 N. E. 396 (1922) ; GRAY, op. cit. supra-,
n. 6, Sec. 110.1, n. 1; 1 SiMES, op. cit. supra, n. 6, Sec. 76.
11Duncomb v. Duncomb, 3 Lev. 437 (1696) ; 2 Bi. Comm. *171-172;
FEARNE, Op. cit. supra, n. 7, *215-221; GRAY, op. cit. supra, n. 6, Sees. 102,
104, 108; KAT s, Op. cit. 8upra, n. 6, Sec. 78; 1 SIMES, op. cit. supra, n. 6,
See. 73.
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vested and contingent remainders offers a sound test by
which remainders which are indestructible may be dis-
tinguished from remainders which are destructible. How-
ever, the problem of the destructibility of remainders is,
in most jurisdictions, now obsolete;" consequently the dis-
tinction between vested and contingent remainders is, for
such purpose, of little importance.
MEMBERSHIP IN A CLASS.
Frequently when courts talk about vested and con-
tingent remainders they are really deciding what persons
are entitled to take where a gift by way of a remainder
has been limited to a class of persons. Assume, for ex-
ample, the limitation of a remainder "to the children of
A", A being a living person. So long as A has no children
the remainder, according to the traditional tests, is clearly
contingent, which is merely another way of saying that
there is no person in being who can qualify as a remain-
derman.12 But when a child is born to A a change takes
I' 1 SIMEs, op. cit. supra, n. 6, Sees. 111-113; RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY
(1936) See. 240. Md. Code (1939) Art. 93, Sec. 308, purports to abolish the
rule of destructibility with respect to all contingent remainders created by
instruments executed after July 1, 1929. But because of the wording of
the statute, which provides that remainders shall take effect "notwith-
standing the determination, by forfeiture, surrender, or merger, or other-
wise" of the preceding estate, there is a remote possibility that the rule is
not completely abolished. This possibility exists because the only methods
of termination expressly mentioned in the statute are methods by which
the particular estate might be prematurely terminated; therefore, if the
ejusdem generis rule of construction is applied the words "or otherwise"
would be construed to mean only other premature terminations of the prior
estate and not terminations resulting from the natural course of events
as a result of the wording of the limitation. For example, suppose a re-
mainder is limited "to the children of B", and the life tenant dies before B
has any children; what becomes of the remainder? However, in view of
the fact that the statute purports to abolish completely the rule of de-
structibility, and since the rule depends on doctrines, relating to seisin,
which are now obsolete, a modern court ought to construe such a statute
so as to abolish completely the destructibility rule and thus give effect to
the legislative purpose. See Miller v. Miller, 91 Kan. 1, 136 P. 953 (1913) ;
Hayward v. Spaulding, 75 N. H. 92, 71 A. 219 (1908). For a general dis-
cussion of the rule of destructibility, see KALES, op. cit. supra, n. 6, Sees.
96-106; 1 SIMES, Op. cit. supra, n. 6, Sees. 98-113; 2 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra,
n. 6, Sees. 326-331; Kales, The Later History of the Rule of Destructibility
of Contingent Remainders (1919) 28 Yale L. Jour. 656.
1 Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore v. Bouse, 29 A. (2d) 906 (Md.,
1943) ; 2 B1. Comm. *168-169; FEARNE, CONTINGENT REMAINDERS (4th Am.
Ed., 1845) *34; MILLER, CONSTRUCTION OF WILLS (1927) Sec. 222; 1 SimEs,
FUTURE INTERESTS (1936) Sec. 67; 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3d Ed.,
1939) Sec. 321; RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (1940) See. 273.
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place and the remainder, which previously was contingent,
now becomes vested; what is meant is that now there is
a person who fits the description of the remainderman
and who is entitled to take an interest under the limitation.
Actually his interest is still contingent in a sense as it has
not yet been determined just what the amount of his
interest will be; consequently, the courts speak of such
a remainder as vested subject to open up, or as vested
subject to being partially divested.'" And although for
most purposes it is treated the same as an indefeasibly
vested interest, that is not true for all purposes. 4 Thus
it appears that there are various types of vested interests
which are not always treated alike; once this is admitted
the basic assumption upon which the conventional ap-
proach to the problems depends fails, and the difficulties
of using such a classification become apparent.
Or take another example, which also involves class gifts,
of a remainder "to such of A's children as are living at
the time of A's death", A being a living person. Accord-
ing to the usual tests such a remainder will remain con-
tingent even after the birth of a child to A, and not until
and unless the child survives A will the remainder be-
come vested.15 Again the use of the terms contingent and
vested to describe the interest of the remainderman under
such a limitation is nothing more than an attempt on
the part of the courts to indicate that until the death of
A there can be no person who fulfills the description of
1"Azarch v. Smith, 222 Ky. 566, 1 S. W. (2d) 968 (1928); Yeaton v.
Roberts, 28 N. H. 459 (1854) ; GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES (4th
Ed., 1942) Secs. 110-110.1; MILLER, op. cit. supra, n. 12, Sees. 73, 87, 219;
1 SIMES, op. cit. supra, n. 12, Sees. 61, 76; 2 TIFFANY, op. cit. 8uprac, n. 12,
Sec. 325; RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (1936, 1940) Sees. 157 (b), 295 (a). In
the recent case of Robinson v. Mercantile Trust Co. of Baltimore, 180 Md.
336, 24 A. (2d) 299 (1942) the Maryland Court of Appeals held a re-
mainder to "all my nephews and nieces" vested at the death of the testa-
trix in the nephews and nieces then living; as no nephews or nieces were
born after the death of the testatrix there was no problem concerning
them, but it seems clear that if there had been any such persons they
would have been included among the remaindermen.
"See text, infra circa ns. 31-3, 35-6, 39, 42-3.
"Schapiro v. Howard, 113 Md. 360, 78 A. 58 (1910) ; Ridgely v. Ridgely,
147 Md. 419, 128 A. 131 (1925) ; cf. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore
v. Bouse, 29 A. (2d) 906 (Md., 1943). GRAY, Op. cit. 8upra, n. 13, See. 108;
MILLER, op. cit. supra, n. 12, Sec. 74; LEAKE, LAW OF PROPERTY IN LAND
(1874) 324; 1 SIMES, op. cit. supra, n. 12, Sec. 93; RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY
(1940) See. 250.
19431
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
the remainderman. This does not mean, however, that
previous to A's death his child does not have an interest
which is recognized by the courts; for some purposes and
by some courts the child is treated as having an interest
in property as soon as he is born.16 This again is an il-
lustration of the fact that the distinction between vested
and contingent remainders will not solve all the cases.
If this were frankly admitted by the courts and the par-
ticular legal problem involved in each case considered,
it would make for much clearer and simpler terminology;
it would then become apparent that the classification of
a particular interest as vested, while another is called
contingent, does not necessarily mean the courts will treat
them differently with reference to a specific problem.
ALmNABILITY.
Often the real problem which a court has before it when
it talks about vested and contingent remainders is whether
the particular interest is alienable or not, and the result
is made to depend on whether the interest is called vested
or contingent, for practically all courts are committed to
the proposition that vested interests are alienable. 7 Thus
all courts would agree that B's interest in the simple case
of a remainder "to B" is freely alienable, provided B is
a person in being. Not only is such a remainder alienable
by B's voluntary act, but it is also subject to the claim of
his creditors-involuntary alienation. Such a case is easy;
but what about a remainder to a class? Suppose the lim-
itation creates a remainder "to the children of A", A being
a living person. As soon as a child is born to A it is
certain that the child will take some interest in the land,
but the amount of his interest is not finally determined.
"See text, infra circa. ns. 20, 37-9, 42-3.
17 3 SIMES, FuTuRE INTERESTS (1936) Sec. 708; 2 TIFFANY, RE.AL PROPERTY
(3d Ed., 1939) Sec. 340; WILLIAMS, REAL PROPERTY (24th ]Rd., 1926) 422.
For general discussions of the problem of alienability of future interests
see Reno, Alienability and Transmissibility of Future Interests in Maryland
(1938) 2 Md. L. Rev. 89; Myerberg, Maryland E.amines the Proposed
Uniform Property Act (1939) 4 Md. L. Rev. 1, 10-22; Bordwell, Alienability
of Non-possessory Interests (1941) 19 N. Car. L. Rev. 279, (1942) 20 N. Car.
L. Rev. 387; Roberts, Transfer of Future Interests (1932) 30 Mich. L. Rev.
349.
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Should he be allowed to transfer his interest before its
amount is determined? That, it is submitted, is a question
of policy which cannot be answered by simply calling the
interest vested or contingent. The more uncertain the
interest the less its value, and the less the social and eco-
nomic pressure for alienability; consequently, there is not
much hardship or inconvenience in holding that the inter-
est of a child of A cannot be transferred during A's life-
time since the demand and the market for it is compara-
tively limited. And the same can be said, with even
greater emphasis, in the case of involuntary alienation;
creditors do not lose much if such interests are held to
be beyond their reach until they become absolute.18  Yet
most courts allow both voluntary and involuntary aliena-
tion of such interests for the reason that they are classified
as vested. 9 But when the remainder is given "to such
of A's children as are living at the time of A's death", A
being a living person, we have an even more uncertain
interest for not only is the amount of a particular child's
interest undetermined, but it is not certain until A's death
that the child will ever be entitled to the use and enjoy-
ment of the property. Therefore, such an interest is usu-
ally classified as contingent until A's death and alienability
denied; but there is modern authority in favor of both
voluntary and involuntary alienability." If the approach
were to consider the problem in view of the uncertain
nature of the interest, and the possible hardship and in-
convenience to the individual and society as a whole, a
much more sensible solution could be reached. The line
18 See 3 SImES, op. cit. supra, n. 17, Sees. 707, 736; LEAcH, CASES ON
FUTURE INTERESTS (2d Ed., 1940) 172-173.
20 Williams v. Armiger, 129 Md. 222, 98 A. 542 (1916); 3 SIMs, op. cit.
supra, n. 17, Sec. 711; 2 TIFFANY, loc. cit. 8upra, n. 17.
g0 Plumlee v. Bounds, 118 Ark. 274, 176 S. W. 140 (1915) ; cf. Clarke v.
Fay, 205 Mass. 228, 91 N. E. 328 (1910). The results are similar where
the remainders are limited to heirs or heirs of the body. Dubois v. Judy,
291 Ill. 340, 126 N. E. 104 (1920) ; Godman v. Simmons, 113 Mo. 122, 20
S. W. 972 (1892) ; FEARNE, CONTINGENT REMAINDERS (4th Am. Ed., 1845)
*365; 3 SImEs, op. cit. 8upra, n. 17, See. 341; WILLIAMS, op. cit. 8upra, n. 17,
at 437-440. Even in jurisdictions where contingent interests are not gen-
erally transferrable they may be transferred by a conveyance which is
effective as a release, or which will operate by way of estoppel, or as a
contract to convey enforceable in equity. Bailey v. Hoppin, 12 R. I. 560
(1880); 3 SImES, op. cit. supra, n. 17, Sec. 710; 2 TAFFyy, loc. cit. supra,
n. 20; Reno, supra, n. 17, 96-97; Myerberg, loc. cit. supra, n. 17.
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between alienable and inalienable remainders, if there is
to be such a distinction, might well be drawn at some point
other than between what are called vested and contingent
interests; it might perchance be drawn between voluntary
and involuntary alienation.21
Practically the same arguments apply when the lim-
itation is in the form of a remainder "to B", but subject
to the condition that "if B dies within A's lifetime then
to C". In such case we have what is generally classified
as a vested remainder although it is subject to being com-
pletely divested. Again it is an uncertain interest, and
whether it should be held freely alienable or not is really
a matter of policy; however, most courts would concede
its alienability since it is classed as a vested interest.22
But when we compare such a case with a remainder "to
B if he survives A", we see the absurdities of the tradi-
tional approach. In the last instance we have what, by
the usual tests, is classified as a contingent remainder, and
therefore, according to some authorities, inalienable."
Other courts allow alienability because the remainder is
contingent as to event only, by which they mean that
there is a person in being, B, who can qualify as remain-
derman under the description if he survives A.24  How-
ever, in both cases the interests are similar and should
be treated alike; in both cases the interests are uncertain;
in both cases the uncertainty depends on the same require-
ment-the necessity that the remainderman survive A;
in both cases the hardship and inconvenience to the re-
mainderman and to society will be the same if alienability
is denied; yet under the conventional view one remainder
is alienable and the other is not. All of which indicates
21 Although this has not generally been done, there is some authority for
making such a distinction, and it is submitted that it is one thing to allow
a man voluntarily to sell his birthright for a mess of pottage but quite a
different thing to force him to do so. See 3 SIMEs, op. cit. supra, n. 17, Sec.
737. The modern trend, however, has quite definitely been toward com-
plete alienability, both voluntary and involuntary, of all Interests,
vested and contingent. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (1936) Secs. 162, 166.22 3 S mns, op. cit. 8upra, n. 17, See. 712.
3 ]bid.
21 3 SimEs, op. cit. supra, n. 17, Sec. 714; 2 TIFFANY, loc. cit. supra, n. 20;
Reno, supra, n. 17, 91; Myerberg, supra, n. 17; Note (1940) The Vesting
of Remainders and Their Alienability, 5 Md. L. Rev. 98.
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quite clearly that the contingent or vested character of
the interest is of little assistance in solving the problem
of alienability.
The proper approach would be for the court to con-
sider the nature of the remainder as an uncertain interest
and to determine whether, as a matter of policy, it is
such an indefinite and uncertain interest that it is not
desirable from a social and economic standpoint to allow
alienation, taking into consideration the advantages and
inconveniences to the remainderman and possible pur-
chasers or creditors. If that were done the real problem
would be directly presented to the court, and in making
their decision they would be in a better position to weigh
the competing factors.
DEscFIBnarY OR DEVIsABILITY.
Perhaps the problem before the court is whether the
remainderman has an interest which will survive his death
and pass by the rules of descent and distribution to his
heirs, or by his will to his devisees.25  Here, too, the ap-
proach frequently is to inquire whether the remainder is
vested or contingent and to let the answer to that question
determine the problem.2 6 Thus all courts would say that
25 At common law the problem was complicated by the fact that land
descended to the heirs of the person last seised or, in the case of future inter-
ests, the last purchaser; except in Maryland, this rule has been changed so
that now future interests descend the same as present interests. 2 BI.
Comm. *208-209; Co. Litt. *llb; 3 SimEs, FUTURE INTERESTS (1936) Secs.
722-723, 725; WILLIAMS, REAL PROPERTY (24th Ed., 1926) 422; Reno, Alien-
ability and TransmissibilitZ of Future Interests in Maryland (1938) 2 Md.
L. Rev. 89, 101-107. With respect to the devisability of future interests
the problem was, and still is, primarily a question of construing the ap-
plicable wills act, for at common law interests in land generally were
not alienable by will. FEARNE, CONTINGENT REMAiNDERS (4th Am. Ed.,
1845) *366-367; 3 SIMEs, supra, Secs. 730-731; WnLIAMS, 8upra, 422,
438; Reno, 8supra, 107.
26 Nickerson v. Harding, 267 Mass. 203, 166 N. E. 703 (1929) ; 2 TIFFANY,
RmAL PROPERTY (3d Ed., 1939) Secs. 340-341; Reno, supra, n. 25, 110-118.
In Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Sanford, 29 A. (2d) 657 (Md., 1943) certain
property was left in trust for M. Jennings Sanford during her life, and
after her death for the further period of twenty-one years during which
the income was to be paid to the child or children of M. Jennings Sanford,
and "from and immediately after the period of twenty-one years from the
death of the said M. Jennings Sanford, said trust shall cease and terminate,
and said [property] shall then vest in and become the absolute estate of
any child or children of the said M. Jennings Sanford". The court held
that the interest of one of the children who died during the twenty-one
year period was vested and passed to his heir; as they stated it, "The only
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a remainder limited absolutely "to B" survives the death
of B and passes to his heirs or devisees. Likewise where
the remainder is to a class, as "to the children of A",
nearly all courts would say that a child of A who dies
during the lifetime of A has such an interest as passes
to his heirs or devisees. Or where the remainder is lim-
ited "to B, but if C marries within A's lifetime then to
C", it would be held to pass to the heirs or devisees of B,
subject, of course, to the possibility of being divested if
the named condition happens.2 7 But where the remainder
is limited "to B, but if he dies within the lifetime of A
then to C", B's interest cannot survive if he dies before A.
Also where the remainder is "to B if he survives A", it
is clear that B has no interest which can survive his death
during A's lifetime. Or if the remainder is limited "to
such of A's children as are living at the time of A's death",
it is quite obvious that a child who dies before A cannot
have an interest which will survive his death. And it is
not necessary to call the remainders contingent, in these
last cases, in order to reach such a result; it is sufficient
to point out that the description of the remainderman is
such that it requires him to survive to a designated time
or else his estate will terminate at his death. Cbnse-
quently, if he does not survive it is clear that neither
his heirs nor his devisees can ever claim any interest after
his death irrespective of whether the remainder is said
to be vested subject to divestment or contingent prior to
that time.2  However, when the contingency is an event
other than survivorship, and is not required to be per-
question ... is whether the ... interest of David H. Sanford was vested
or contingent. If vested, then it would go to his father as his sole heir.
• .. If contingent, it would go back to the estate, there to be distributed
to the decedent's heirs and next of kin." Id. at 659. This result may be
sustained in spite of the words of contingency, which seem to postpone the
gift of the remainder until the termination of the trust, because the gift of
the income to the children during the twenty-one year period overcomes
this apparent contingency and indicates that the remaindermen are really
the owners of the property even prior to the time for distribution. In re
Williams, L. R. [1907] 1 Ch. 180; Steinway v. Steinway, 163 N. Y. 183, 57
N. E. 312 (1900); 2 SIMEs, op. cit. 8upra, n. 25, Sec. 356; RESTATEMENT,
PRoPERTY (1940) Sec. 259.
17 3 SIMES, op. cit. 8upra, n. 25, Sec. 726.
213 SIEs, op. cit. supra, n. 25, Sec. 727; 2 TiTFANY, op. cit. supra, n. 26,
Sec. 341; RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (1936) Secs. 164, 165.
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formed by the designated remainderman, there is no rea-
son why the interest of the remainderman should not
survive his death even though the contingency has not
yet happened.29  Therefore, a remainder limited "to B
if A dies without leaving children living at the time of
his death", will pass to B's heirs or devisees even though
he dies before A. Thus it appears that the line between
remainders which are descendible or devisable and those
which are not can no longer be drawn by using the old
tests of vested and contingent interests.
Ti RULE AGANST PERPEruJTLs.
Another problem which the courts usually decide by
first classifying the interests involved as either vested or
contingent is the application of the rule against perpe-
tuities, for according to the accepted doctrine vested inter-
ests are not subject to the rule.30  Thus remainders lim-
ited "to B", or "to B, but if he dies without leaving issue
who survive him then to C" can never violate the rule,
provided B is a person in being or one who will be de-
termined within the allowed period, although the gift to
C, in the latter case, may do so. But again the traditional
tests are not entirely accurate, and in at least one instance
remainders which are usually classified as vested are held
subject to the operation of the rule against perpetuities.
This is true in the case of remainders to a class where
29 Ibid. In the case of Gittinger v. Farmers & Mechanics Nat. Bank, 180
Md. 640, 26 A. (2d) 414 (1942) the testator left the residue of his estate
in trust for his wife during her lifetime, and upon her death the trust
terminated and, after certain specific gifts, the balance of the property
was given to three named persons subject to the condition that "if any of
them be dead at the time of the termination of said trust, then to the
survivor or survivors of them equally." All three of the named remainder-
men died prior to the termination of the trust. The Court of Appeals of
Maryland held the remainders were vested subject to being completely
divested, but since the divestment was to take place only if some of the
remaindermen survived the termination of the trust, the divesting condi-
tion did not happen and the remainders passed to the heirs and devisees
or legatees of the remaindermen.
80 GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES (4th Ed., 1942) Sees. 205, 283;
MILLER, CONSTRUCTION OF WILLS (1927) Sec. 322; 2 SIMEs, FUTURE INTER-
ESTS (1936) Secs. 498, 504; 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3d Ed., 1939) Sec.
401. For a very excellent and interesting discussion of the whole problem
of the rule against perpetuities see Leach, Perpetuities in a Nutshell (1939)
51 Harv. L. Rev. 638. It has been suggested that the terminology would
be more accurate if the name rule against remoteness were adopted rather
than rule against perpetuities. GRAY, supra, Sec. 2.
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the remainder is subject to open up and include after-born
members.3' Take, for example, a remainder "to the chil-
dren of A", A being a living person. As previously indi-
cated, such a remainder is usually classified as vested as
soon as a child is born to A, for there is then a person
who fits the description of the remainderman; but it is
not yet certain just what the extent of his interest will
be, for the exact amount of each remainderman's interest
will not be determined until the class closes. Now for
some purposes the fact that such an interest is indefinite
in amount does not matter,32 but for the purpose of the
rule against perpetuities it is necessary that the extent
of an interest be finally determined within the allowed
period; that is, in gifts to a class both the minimum and
maximum membership must be determined within the
period of the rule-in other words the class must both
open and close in order not to be subject to the operation
of the rule. To justify this result Professor Gray was forced
to admit that the conventional statement about vested
interests not being subject to the rule against perpetuities
must be qualified, though he also argued that remainders
which are vested subject to open up are in reality not
vested. 3 It is, of course, settled that remainders which
are limited in such a way that they may remain contingent
for more than the period allowed by the rule against
perpetuities are invalid.34 Consequently, remainders lim-
ited "to B if he survives A", or "to such of A's children as
are living at the time of his death", or "to B if A dies with-
out leaving children living at the time of his death" will
violate the rule if it is possible that the named contingency
may not happen within the prescribed period-that is, if
the uncertainty may extend beyond the time limit. Thus
1 Jee v. Audley, 1 Cox 324 (1787) ; Leake v. Robinson, 2 Mer. 363 (1817) ;
GRAY, op. cit. supra, n. 30, Sees. 205.2, 369-398.2; MTLER , op. cit. supra,
n. 30, Sec. 328; 2 SimES, op. cit. supra, n. 30, Sees. 499, 527.
32 See -text, supra circa, ns. 9, 18-19, and infra circa, ns. 38-9, 42-3.
31 He states, "Though the interest is called vested, it is in truth con-
tingent." GRAY, OP. cit. 8upra, n. 30, Sec. 205.2. But in a footnote to the
above statement he says, "Or at least it is treated as contingent for the
purposes of the Rule against Perpetuties." Id., n. 4.
8, GRAY, op. cit. supra, n. 30, Sees. 206, 285-286; 2 SIMES, op. cit. supra,
n. 30, Sec. 505; 2 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra, n. 30, Sec. 402.
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it again appears that the distinction between vested and
contingent interests is not a satisfactory standard to use
in deciding all cases.
INJURIES TO THE LAND.
Many times the question which the courts have to
decide is whether the remainderman has the type of inter-
est which entitles him to protection against the acts of
others which injure, or threaten injury to, the land. In
such cases the problem is complicated by the fact that the
action may be against either the life tenant (for waste)
or a stranger, and the relief sought may be either dam-
ages for injuries previously committed or an injunction
against threatened injury.
Where the remainder is limited "to B" who is seeking
damages against A, the life tenant, for injuries which A
has committed, it is clear that B can recover.35 But sup-
pose that the remainder is "to the children of A", and
during the lifetime of A, he being the life tenant, one
of his children brings an action to recover for waste which
A has committed. In this case, although the remainder-
man's interest is usually called vested, it is uncertain in
amount, and, therefore, it is extremely difficult, if not
impossible, to award damages to any one child prior to
the death of A. For how can the amount of damages be
determined before the extent of the remainderman's inter-
est is settled?3 6 A similar difficulty is present where the
remainder is limited "to B, but if he dies within A's life-
time then to C", for it cannot be determined with certainty
prior to A's death whether B or C will be the one ultimately
entitled to the land and thus the person who has been
injured. Likewise where the remainder is limited "to such
of A's children as are living at the time of A's death",
or "to B if he survives A", it is impossible, prior to A's
as RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (1936) See. 187. For discussions of the com-
mon law rules regarding waste and the development of the modern rules
see 2 BI. Comm. *282-283; Co. Litt. *53a, b, 54a; 3 Sims, FUTUR INTER-
ESTS (1936) See. 616; 2 TiFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3d Ed., 1939) Sees. 646,
648.
86 See 3 SnMEs, op. cit. 8Rpra, n. 35, Sec. 622; RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY
(1936) Sec. 188.
19431
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
death, to determine what person eventually will be en-
titled to the land and, therefore, to determine to whom
the damages should be paid.37 However, in all the above
cases it is clear that the tenant has injured the land and
that he ought to be made to pay damages to rectify the
wrong he has committed. Consequently, where the suit
is brought in a representative capacity, and the damages
are paid into court and held until the uncertainty is re-
moved and then paid over to the remainderman when it
is finally determined who is entitled to the land, the
dilemma is solved and relief can be given. 8
On the other hand, if the relief sought is an injunction
to prevent further, or threatened, injury to the land, the
difficulties suggested above do not arise. Since the life
tenant has only a limited interest it is clear that he is
not entitled to commit waste, and injunctive relief is
proper; therefore, any remainderman who has a reason-
able probability of acquiring a present interest in the land
should be allowed to protect his interest through the use
of injunctive relief, for he will, at the same time, protect
the true remainderman and will cause no hardship to the
life tenant.39 Thus in all of the preceding illustrations
an injunction should be granted, provided the other re-
quirements for such relief are present.
Where the action is brought by a remainderman to re-
cover damages from a stranger who has caused an injury
to the premises, we are confronted by a further difficulty
in that some courts allow the life tenant to recover for
the entire injury to the land and, consequently, refuse
to allow any remainderman to recover damages in an action
against a stranger.4' But in jurisdictions where the life
"
7 Latham v. Roanoke Railroad & Lumber Co., 139 N. C. 9, 51 S. E. 780
(1905); 3 SIMEs, op. cit. 8upra, n. 35, Sec. 625; RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY
(1936) Sec. 188.
'" Watson v. Wolff-Goldman Realty Co., 95 Ark. 18, 128 S. W. 581 (1910);
3 SiMEs, op. cit. supra, n. 35, See. 628; RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (1936)
Sec. 189(1) (c).
" Ohio Oil Co. v. Daughetee, 240 Il1. 361, 88 N. E. 818 (1909) ; Brown
v. Brown, 89 W. Va. 339, 109 S. E. 815 (1921) ; 3 SIMEs, op. cit. supra, n.
35, Secs. 616, 622, 625; 2 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra, n. 35, Sec. 647; RESTATE-
MENT, PROPERTY (1936) Sec. 189(1) (a, b) (2) (b).
10 Rogers v. Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Co., 213 N. Y. 246, 107 N. E. 661
(1915) ; 3 SIMES, op. cit. 8upra, n. 35, See. 619.
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tenant is limited in his recovery to the injuries to his own
interest, or in cases where he has only recovered for the
injury to the life estate, the remainderman may recover
for the injuries to his interest;41 in such instances prob-
lems similar to those discussed in connection with the right
of a remainderman to recover from the life tenant arise.
Thus when the remainder is limited absolutely "to B"
there is no difficulty, and B may recover damages for
the injury to the land. But where the remainderman's
interest is uncertain, either because the amount of his
interest is not yet determined or because it is impossible
to tell what person will ultimately be entitled to the
premises, it is impossible to award damages to any person
before the uncertainty is removed. For that reason where
the remainder is limited "to the children of A", or "to B,
but if he dies before A then to C", or "to B if he survives
A", or "to such of A's children as are living at the time
of his death", recovery is denied unless the suit is brought
in a representative capacity and the money is paid into
court and held until the uncertainty is resolved.42  How-
ever, if the relief sought is an injunction to prevent future
injury to the land, there is no difficulty since the defendant
is a stranger to the land and not entitled to make any
use of it. Therefore, such relief may be given whenever
the plaintiff has a reasonable probability of acquiring a
present interest.4 8
Here again we have an illustration of the inadequacy
of the distinction between vested and contingent interests
as a basis for the solution of all problems involving re-
mainders.4
MISCELLANEOUS.
There are other problems involving remainders which
the courts often determine by first classifying the interests
involved as vested or contingent, and there also are prob-
41 Zimmerman v. Shreeve, 59 Md. 357 (1882); 3 SIMES, loC. cit. supra,
n. 40; RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (1936) Sec. 214(a).
42 3 SimEs, Op. cit. supra, n. 35, Sec. 628; RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (1936)
See. 214(b).
483 SImES, op. cit. supra, n. 35, Secs. 622, 625; RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY
(1936) Sec. 212.
41 See 3 Si. Es, op. cit. supra, n. 35, Sec. 614.
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lems in which the vested or contingent character of the
interest is of no consequence. Thus the right of a remain-
derman to insist that the life tenant pay current charges,
which are liens against the property, such as taxes or
interest on mortgages, should not depend on the vested or
contingent nature of the remainder. 5 Likewise the right
of a remainderman, who has a future interest in personalty,
to insist on the life tenant giving security should be, and
is, determined by considerations other than the vested or
contingent character of the future interest. 6 Similarly
the right of a holder of a future interest to bring a bill to
quiet title ought not to depend on whether the interest is
classified as vested or contingent and such seems to be the
rule.47 But the right of a holder of a future interest to
bring a partition proceeding, if such right exists at all, is
universally limited to holders of vested interests; not only
must the interest be one which is classified as vested but
it must be indefeasibily vested.4" On the other hand, the
power of a court to order a sale of land which is subject
to future interests seems to depend, to a great extent, on
whether the interests involved are contingent.49 While
in actions involving title, the question whether the holder
of a future interest must be made a party to the proceeding
frequently depends upon considerations other than the
vested or contingent nature of the interest involved; how-
ever, in some cases the character of the interest is im-
portant." And the same is true in cases in which the
453 SimES, FUTURE INTERESTS (1936) Sec. 630; RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY
(1936) Sees. 187(a, b), 190.
"I Clarke v. Terry, 34 Conn. 176 (1867) ; Scott v. Scott, 137 Iowa 239, 114
N. W. 881 (1908); 3 SIMES, op. cit. s8upra, n. 45, Sec. 639; RESTATEMENT,
PROPERTY (1936) Sees. 202, 203, 206(a).
47 3 SIMES, op. cit. supra, n. 45, Sees. 651-652.
48 MILLER, CONSTRUCTION OF WILLS (1927) Sec. 215; 3 SIMES, op. cit.
supra, n. 45, Sees. 657, 659, 665; RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (1936) Sees. 170,
171, 174, 175.
4 The most important factors seem to be the existence of minors or
unborn remaindermen who will be benefited by the sale. Compare Gavin
v. Curtin, 171 Ill. 640, 49 N. E. 523 (1898), and Cagle v. Schaefer, 115 S. C.
35, 104 S. E. 321 (1920), with Rekovsky v. Glisczinski, 175 Minn. 531, 221
N. W. 906 (1928) ; 3 SIMES, op. cit. supra, n. 45, Sec. 792; RESTATEMENT,
PROPERTY (1936) See. 179; Schnebly, Power of Life Tenant or Remainder-
man to Eaxtinguish Other Interests by Judicial Process (1928) 42 Harv. L.
Rev. 30,
60 The Important factors are: the type of proceeding; the vested or
contingent nature of the interest; whether or not the person is in being;
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problem is whether the failure or renunciation of a pre-
ceding interest causes the remainder to accelerate; again
the determining factor may be the vested or contingent
nature of the interest involved." One other problem must
be mentioned-that is, the application of tax statutes in
cases involving future interests. In such cases the question
may involve the application of income taxes,52 gift taxes,5 3
or transfer and succession taxes.54 Here again the tradi-
whether he is a member of a class so numerous that it is impracticable tojoin all members; whether other persons, who are made parties, are inter-
ested in the outcome of the litigation in the same way as the unjoined
person; whether there is a trustee or guardian ad litem who represents the
holder of the future interest. Weberpals v. Jenny, 300 Ill. 145, 133 N. E.
62 (1921); 3 SIMES, op. cit. supra, n. 45, Secs. 673, 687; RESTATEMENT,
PROPERTY (1936) Sees. 180-186; Roberts, Virtual Representation in Actions
Affecting Future Interests (1936) 30 Ill. L. Rev. 580. It has been stated
that the doctrine of virtual representation never applies to vested interests,
or in cases where the remainderman is in esse. See Card v. Finch, 142
N. C. 140, 149, 54 S. E. 1009, 1012 (1906). An early Maryland case refused
to recognize the doctrine. Downin v. Sprecher, 35 Md. 474 (1872).
51 Scotten v. Moore, 5 Boyce 545, 93 A. 373 (Del., 1914) ; Randall v.
Randall, 85 Md. 430, 37 A. 209 (1897) ; Cockey v. Cockey, 141 Md. 373, 118
A. 850 (1922) ; MILLER, op. cit. supra, n. 48, Sec. 221; 3 SIMES, op cit. supra,
n. 45, Secs. 756-759; RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (1936) Sees. 230-233, 236, 237.
52 In Chandler v. Field, 63 F. (2d) 13 (C. C. A. 1st, 1933) ; Huggett v.
Burnet, 64 F. (2d) 705 (Ct. App. D. C., 1933) ; and Commissioner v. Alford,
282 Mass. 113, 184 N. E. 437 (1933), the distinction* between interests
which were vested, vested subject to being divested, and contingent was
held important in determining what income was taxable.SaIn Robinette v. Helvering, 63 S. Ct. 540 (U. S., 1943), and Smith v.
Shaughnessy, 63 S. Ct. 545 (U. S., 1943), it was held that inter vivos
transfers which created contingent remainders in unascertained persons
were completed gifts and subject to taxation, and in determining the amount
of the tax the value of the remainders should be included.
54 For example, the courts have disagreed as to whether a remainder
which is subject to a power of appointment in the life tenant is taxable,
under a transfer or succession tax, upon the death of the life tenant, when
the power is not exercised or when it is exercised in favor of the remainder-
man. Compare Matter of Lansing, 182 N. Y. 238, 74 N. E. 882 (1905), with
Minot v. Treasurer & Receiver General, 207 Mass. 588, 93 N. E. 973 (1911) ;
see RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (1940) Sec. 333. This is due, in part at least,
to the fact that according to the traditional view a remainder subject to a
power is vested. Matter of Lansing, supra; 1 SIMES, op. cit. supra, n. 45,
Sec. 80. Another situation which causes trouble is where a transfer or
succession tax is passed after the future interest is created but before it
becomes a present possessory interest; in such cases whether or not a tax
can be collected upon the death of the life tenant may depend on whether
the remainder vests before or after the passage of the statute. In re Pell's
Estate, 171 N. Y. 48, 63 N. E. 789 (1902). In Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of
Baltimore v. Bouse, 29 A. (2d) 906 (Md., 1943) a succession tax passed
after the future interests were created was applied in the case of contin-
gent remainders, but not to those which were held to have vested prior to
the passage of the statute; the court stated: "The vesting in interest con-
stitutes the succession. . . .Accordingly the rate of inheritance tax is to
be determined according to the law in effect at the time when remainders
vest In interest, when the rights of the parties become fixed and certain,
and not when the remainders pass in possession upon the death of the
life tenant. . . .Therefore, the question to be decided is whether the
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tional concepts do not work well and the trend of the
late cases indicates that the vested or contingent character
of the interest is of little importance, in most instances,
in determining whether the tax applies.55
The above review of some of the typical problems in-
volving remainders shows that the traditional legal tech-
nique, which assumes that all questions concerning re-
mainders can be answered by first classifying the interests
as vested or contingent, is no longer a satisfactory method
by which to solve the cases. In most instances this ap-
proach serves no useful purpose; it is, in fact, nothing
more than a preliminary exercise in mental gymnastics.
This is due, in a large measure, to the fact that the dis-
tinction between vested and contingent remainders is not
clear and definite, as assumed by the courts, and that it
is based on principles which, although they had historical
importance and justification, are now obsolete and have
no particular significance with respect to the problems
which the courts now have to decide. 6 The solution would
be for the courts to abandon their basic assumption that
remainders under the testamentary trusts had so vested prior to the taking
effect of the Direct Inheritance Tax Act that there was thereafter no
occasion in respect to which the tax might constitutionally be imposed."
Id., at 908-909.
Note, for instance, the remarks of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Hel-
vering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106, 117-118 (1940) where he says: "The law
of contingent and vested remainders is full of casuistries. There are great
diversities among the several states as to the conveyancing significance of
like grants; sometimes in the same state there are conflicting lines of deci-
sion, one series ignoring the other. . . . The importation of these distinc-
tions and controversies from the law of property into the administration of
the estate tax precludes a fair and workable tax system. Essentially the
same interests, judged from the point of view of wealth, will be taxable
or not, depending upon elusive and subtle casuistries which may have their
historic justification but possess no relevance for tax purposes. These un-
witty diversities of the law of property derive from medieval concepts
as to the necessity of a continuous seisin. Distinctions which originated
under a feudal economy when land dominated social relations are pecu-
liarly irrelevant in the application of tax measures now so largely directed
toward intangible wealth"; and Judge Frank's comments, on the effect of
the Hallock case, in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Marshall, 125
F. (2d) 943, 945 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942) in which he refers to the distinction
between vested and contingent remainders as "a sort of sacred cow", and
concludes that we should be grateful that the distinction "need trouble
us no further anywhere in the field of federal taxes." But compare the
remarks of the Maryland Court of Appeals quoted supra, n. 54.
5 According to the orthodox view, the distinction between vested and
contingent remainders is based on the concept of seisin. See the discussion
of the rule of destructibility, text, supra circa, ns. 5-11, particularly n. 5,
and the remarks of Mr. Justice Frankfurter quoted supra, n. 55.
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all cases involving remainders must be solved by first
classifying the interests as vested or contingent, and to
approach the cases by carefully analyzing them to deter-
mine the exact problem involved and then to decide that
problem; usually this can be done without determining
whether the interest is a vested or contingent remainder.57
Such an approach would bring before the court in each
case the exact question to be decided and would cause
them to consider that question on its merits without regard
to some abstract concept; they would then be in a position
to weigh all the competing factors and to balance the vari-
ous interests involved before making their decision. This,
it is submitted, would tend to reduce the apparent conflict
which one now finds, in many instances, between the lan-
guage of the cases and the actual decisions.58
57 See SIMs, CASES ON FUTURE INTrUSTs (1939), Introductory Note to
Part I, p. 10. An interesting admission that this is true is found in the
case of Dowd v. Scally, 184 N. W. 340 (Iowa, 1921) where the court, after
rendering one opinion in which they discussed the distinction between
vested and contingent remainders at length (a portion of the opinion is
quoted in the text, supra circa. ns. 1, 4), on rehearing stated: "On the
original submission of the appeal the argument was largely confined to
the question whether the remainder . . was vested or contingent...
A petition for rehearing was granted, and further arguments have been
made by both parties. On reconsideration we are of the opinion that a
settlement of the vexed question of the proper distinction between
vested and contingent remainders is not necessarily involved in the case,
and we refrain from entering again upon that discussion, believing, as we
do, that whether as a technical proposition the devise . . . be vested or
contingent, the result in this case must be the same." Id., at 341.
58 Excellent examples of this conflict may be found in four recent Mary-
land cases: Robinson v. Mercantile Trust Co. of Baltimore, 180 Md. 336, 24
A. (2d) 299 (1942), cited supra, n. 13; Gittinger v. Farmers & Merchants
Nat. Bank, 180 Md. 640, 26 A. (2d) 414 (1942), cited supra, n. 29; Safe
Deposit & Trust Co. v. Sanford, 29 A. (2d) 657 (Md., 1943), cited supra,
n. 26; Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore v. Bouse, 29 A. (2d) 906
(Md., 1943), cited supra, n. 54. In all of these cases the Court made the
vested or contingent character of the remainders the controlling factor in
reaching their decisions; in most of them the decisions can be justified,
but the language used and the principles stated in the opinions are not
always consistent, and, in at least one of the cases, the result reached is
difficult to sustain. This is true in the Bouse case where the Court held
that some of the remainders were contingent, and thus subject to the
inheritance tax, while others were vested, and therefore not taxable,
although all of the remainders were created by instruments which con-
tained similar or identical language which according to the traditional
tests, and the principles stated in the opinion itself, would seem to create
contingent remainders. [ED.-It is planned that the REvIEw will publish,
in a following number of this Volume, a casenote on Safe Deposit and
Trust Co. of Baltimore v. Bouse, supra.]
